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TIME OUT OF JOINT: BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGY AND 
POST-STRUCTURALISM 
Jack Reynolds
It seems to me that a philosophical concern with the inter-relation of  time and politics immediately discloses 
that one is not an analytic philosopher. To put it less slavishly (that is, less in terms of  an identity bestowed 
from outside), a positive concern with the conjunction of  such themes is one of  the core criteria for being a 
“continental” philosopher.1 Such generalisations need not entail that the various different forms of  continental 
philosophy are effaced or denied, however, since how to understand this conjunction is variously construed. As 
Elizabeth Grosz suggests: 
Each of  the three temporal modalities (past, present, and future in all of  their conjugative 
complexities) entail presumptions regarding the others that are often ill- or unconsidered: how we 
understand the past, and our links to it through reminiscence, melancholy or nostalgia, prefigures 
and contains corresponding concepts about the present and the future; the substantiality or privilege 
we pragmatically grant to the present has implications for the retrievability of  the past and the 
predictability of  the future; and, depending on whether we grant to the future the supervening power 
to rewrite the present and past, so too we must problematise the notions of  identity, origin, and 
development.2 
And certainly there is no consensus in continental philosophy as to the appropriate answer to these and other 
issues, nor to the relationship between what David Hoy calls the times of  our lives and the time of  the universe 
(the ‘objective’ time of  physicists)3. This enduring interest in the relationship between time and politics is one 
important marker among others that helps to provide a loose philosophical identity to that motley crew that 
is sometimes sloppily called ‘continental’, although it arguably also has some kind of  diagnostic privilege 
over other family resemblance features. This is because the endorsement (and rejection) of  various different 
philosophical methods is partly bound up with their success (and failure) in illuminating the relationship between 
time and politics. Consider the following ‘methods’: dialectics, transcendental reasoning post-Kant, genealogy, 
hermeneutical and psychoanalytic techniques, Heidegger’s destructive retrieve (and Derridean deconstruction), 
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the Frankfurt School style critique of  modernity, as well as the general wariness of  aligning philosophical 
method with either common-sense or a deferential relationship to the findings of  the sciences, indexed to the 
present, etc. (at least one of  the last two characterises a central aspect of  the meta-philosophy of  most analytic 
philosophers). From Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, to Bergson’s durée, to Heidegger’s Being and Time, time 
and method have been central to continental philosophy at least since the start of  the twentieth century and, to 
a lesser extent, since the nineteenth century (think of  Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx). 
In this essay, however, I would like to respond to Nathan Widder’s impressive book, Reflections on Time and Politics, 
by highlighting what I take to be one of  the major internal differences within continental philosophy that 
Widder’s book helps to make manifest: that between phenomenology and post-structuralism (which includes 
the renewed interest in, and use of, Nietzsche and Bergson’s work by poststructuralist philosophers). While 
many deplore the use of  umbrella terms like these, I hope to be able to proffer some useful generalisations about 
each in regard to their philosophies of  time. Although it is implicitly present in Husserl’s work, an association 
between time and normativity is explicitly emphasised in Bergson’s and Heidegger’s work. Heidegger’s Being and 
Time, for example, draws a strong association between so-called “vulgar” time and inauthenticity. Moreover, for 
authentic Dasein time passes in a coherent and connected manner—that is, at least once Angst has jolted Dasein 
from its immersion in worldly time, clock time, and vulgar time. Without considering Heidegger much at all, 
Widder’s book takes what I characterise as a poststructuralist position concerning the intersection between time 
and normativity. For him (and the various philosophers that he draws on, particularly Deleuze and Bergson) 
phenomenological accounts of  time are thought to be problematic for still seeing time as, if  not the measure of  
change, then at least as irremediably bound up with movement. And certainly most of  the criticisms that Deleuze, 
Derrida and other poststructuralist philosophers pose regarding phenomenology revolve around issues to do 
with time and transcendental philosophy. One of  their main objections is that phenomenological descriptions 
of  the experience of  time focus, predominantly if  not exclusively, on the manner in which time gathers, or 
conjoins rather than disjoins (we have already seen that this appears to be true of  authentic Dasein). More 
generally, the worry is that “lived time” is described by phenomenologists as a neat and unified continuum, but 
for the post-structuralists this kind of  experience is an illusion of  sorts. On their view, the unity of  experience 
revealed in the ‘living present’ covers over something more fundamental about time—if  I can put it somewhat 
dramatically as the theorists involved typically do, that is time as wounding (see Deleuze’s The Logic of  Sense), 
time as out of  joint in the manner of  Hamlet’s memorable refrain (see Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition and 
Derrida’s Spectres of  Marx), time as “nick” as Grosz puts it in The Nick of  Time, or time as ungrounding as Widder 
phrases a related point, as casting asunder the identity of  subjects and bodies. To put the point another way, 
it seems to me that the poststructuralist philosophers want to quite radically disassociate time from movement, 
and to allege that phenomenological conceptions of  time too readily associate time and movement. What is at 
stake in this charge, and why would it matter if  it is true? The poststructuralists (including Widder) allege that 
any association of  time and movement threatens to be unable to explain the advent of  genuine difference and 
novelty, and is, at best, only an indirect way of  understanding time.
Of  course, one wouldn’t want to overstate the differences between phenomenologists and poststructuralists. We 
might note that in certain of  his writings Derrida is not clearly on what I am characterising as the poststructuralist 
side of  the equation at all. After all, whether there can be any more direct understanding of  time than the 
vulgar common sense one is the subject of  Derrida’s great early essay on Heidegger, “Ousia and Gramme: Note 
on a Note from Being and Time” (in Margins of  Philosophy). In addition, poststructuralist understandings of  time 
crucially depend upon the work of  phenomenologists like Heidegger and Levinas as much as they depend on 
Nietzsche and Bergson, and they all share in common the concern to avoiding reducing philosophy of  time to 
clarifications regarding the physicist’s understanding of  it (Einstein and four-dimensionalism4) and are equally 
reluctant to concede that the physicists give us the truth about time tout court. As Hoy suggests in his recent 
book The Time of  our Lives, Heidegger maintains that starting from objective time (the time of  the universe) the 
philosopher will not be able to adequately explain the time of  our lives, but starting from the temporality of  
our lives we can explain objective time5. To put Heidegger’s point simply, then, we cannot understand objective 
time without existential time, and such a move is not dissimilar to that made by Bergson and various more 
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recent thinkers, whatever the concrete differences in their actual accounts of  temporality. In different ways, 
both phenomenologists and poststructuralists also seek to avoid a conception of  time that we might associate 
with common sense and the natural attitude. This view understands time as the chronological succession of  
an infinite series of  ‘nows’, or instants, stretching from the future to the past. Why the future first, and the 
past second? Well, if  a priority is given to this present instant, then we know that there are various things that 
have not yet happened (a not-yet-now), which we will come closer to (note the spatial metaphor), which will 
then happen, and which will then be in the past (a no-longer-now). This conception of  time involves a series of  
moments, and a linear trajectory, which clock-time regulates and subjects to measurement. The arguments 
against such views tend to rely on various forms of  transcendental reasoning, which attempt to show either that 
linear-clock time—or theoretical ideas of  time that are dependent on a clock-like series of  moments—is an 
abstraction from lived time, or that clock-time presupposes the existence of  a past that cannot be recalled and a 
future that cannot be anticipated, and thus give us a one-sided account of  the structures of  time.
But to return to the differend that separates much work in contemporary continental philosophy (as practiced 
both on the continent and in Anglo-American countries), while I think that Widder, Deleuze, et al are roughly 
correct in their diagnosis of  phenomenology’s association of  time (or, better, temporality) with the subject, 
including with the movement of  subject, I am not convinced that they are correct in considering this to be a 
theoretical weakness, nor that the proffered alternatives are to be preferred. I myself  am pulled both ways, and 
in a critical vein here want to point to some problems with the “time out of  joint” trajectory of  Widder and 
others, or at the very least to establish some risks that are associated with such a perspective. My basic worry is 
that too often the transcendental critique of  vulgar time and any emphasis on the “living-present” and other 
such “chronopathologies” trades on claims of  necessity that are either speculative (the transcendental claim is 
not established as a necessary one, but is at best a weak inference to a better explanation) or that depend upon 
their association with an accompanying moral and political tenor (what I have elsewhere called “empirico-
romanticism”6) that threatens to be dogmatic. While I agree with Widder and others that time and politics 
are intimately connected I also think that theoretical accounts of  this fragile connection need to be careful 
to avoid lapsing into dogmatism, and this is so even if  the relevant conception of  time is not tethered to any 
teleological account of  the trajectory of  history. To worry about this risk is not to simply be the victim of  a false 
problem as Widder suggests (p4), or a transcendental “illusion” as James Williams phrased a related objection7. 
But this is all very abstract. Using a simple sporting example, I will try to clarify some of  the key aspects of  a 
phenomenological account of  temporal experience as well as what Deleuze and Widder are worried about in 
phenomenology’s focus on lived time, and thus, by default, the living-present.
CRICKET AND THE ‘LIVING-PRESENT’
It is received wisdom in cricket and other sports that players both are not, and should not, be directly 
phenomenologically aware of  any kind of  conscious decision-making processes while absorbed in what various 
theorists since Hubert Dreyfus have called skilful coping. In cricket, one reason for this kind of  injunction is 
obvious enough: batting is, as John Sutton observes, regulated improvisation under severe time constraints8. 
Faced with a fast bowler (for those from the USA, think of  an express baseball pitcher), say Brett Lee in his 
prime, there is no time for thinking or any kind of  hesitation; batsmen need to spontaneously respond, and to 
be totally absorbed in the moment. There is not even time, according to Sutton’s research, to actually watch the 
ball all the way and then respond. Despite the fact that almost all coaches will advocate unwavering watching 
of  the ball, elite players don’t, however, watch the ball for its entire trajectory. The best players watch it out of  
the hand, anticipate where it will land and direct their vision there, then attend to where it lands on the pitch 
and anticipate where it will go. Without this kind of  anticipation, one could never response adequately to the 
visual stimulus in a timely fashion when faced with a 150km an hour delivery. 
Let’s consider the temporal experience involved here. It seems clear that in any “living present”, the sports 
player retains the past in the form of  a retention or sedimentation in the body of  what has happened before—
this is what is called procedural memory in psychology and cognitive science. At the same time, they must 
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also anticipate probable future scenarios regarding what will be likely to happen in the future. Such coping 
techniques simultaneously carry the weight of  past sedimentation and yet are also productive of  a world of  
anticipated possibilities that are increasingly differentiated from each other; for the expert, the situation calls for, 
or solicits, increasingly refined responses. Moreover it is the ability to perform such anticipations more quickly, 
and with greater accuracy, that separates experts from those who are merely competent. Such responses cannot 
be mechanistic, or rigidly rule-governed. Every stroke will need to be played in slightly different circumstances, 
on a different pitch, with differing wind conditions, differing condition of  the ball, and an altered trajectory of  
the delivery, to mention just a few of  the variables. As such, any given cricket stroke will never be totally new, 
but neither will it be brute or instinctual repetition either, having to be attentive to the difference presented by 
each ball, but still implicitly drawing on one’s repertoire of  past experiences that contribute to each shot (hence 
each batsman has a recognisable style). Through training and skill, one is solicited by the situation to respond 
to it in more and more nuanced and specific ways. Being-in-the-present, on this view, involves an experience of  
time that synthesises or integrates elements of  the past and the future within its purview.
In his reflections on the phenomenology of  internal time-consciousness in the book of  that name, Husserl makes 
a related point. He famously suggests that our integrated experience of  a melody—even on first listening—
implies that any so-called ‘now’ must have a retentive element that retains the past notes, and a protentive 
moment that anticipates future elaborations, as well as what he calls the primal impression. Otherwise, our 
experience of  the sounds would be random and disparate in a way that it is not, without any kind of  ability to 
hear a melody. This kind of  temporal experience then, is a synthesis, in which any living present, for it to be 
meaningful, involves a retentive and protentive element rather than being a self-contained instant, or a series 
of  such instants. 
While there is an important phenomenological distinction between these kind of  acts that involve procedural 
memory and a passive synthesis of  time, and explicit biographical memory or reflection on our past, we should 
also note that the ‘don’t over think’ injunction that plays a large role in sporting activity usually prescribes 
more than just being in the present when engaged in the activity in question. The cricketer who dwells on the 
past between deliveries, say, or who reflects on their lucky escape a ball before when someone dropped them 
on 99, or the minefield that is the pitch, is not likely to perform well. Likewise the player who is preoccupied 
with getting to the lunch break in ten minutes time without being dismissed, rather than playing each ball on 
its merits, is also likely to make a mistake. This doesn’t seem merely to be folklore, but is borne out by various 
studies (again, see Sutton). An elite sportsman or woman thus has to train themselves to put past biographical 
experiences out of  their mind; certainly out of  their immediate focus. Being a good cricketer depends not 
merely on talent and not merely on training in the various skill domains either, but on training one’s mind; in 
particular, in controlling one’s temporal experience throughout an afternoon or so of  projectiles being aimed 
at one’s torso. Without putting too fine a point on it, it seems that one performs better when one is not haunted 
by ghosts from the past or future. 
Likewise, Dreyfus produces some quite compelling empirical research on decision-making processes that suggest 
that it is a spontaneous embodied responsive to the environment (which is not a matter of  rational calculation) 
that leads to mastery and expertise in any number of  given fields, whether they be basketball, chess, business, 
or even morality9. Constant calculators, people who reflect all of  the time on the best course of  action to take, 
tend not to make the best decisions and do not often reach the highest levels of  expertise in a given field. This 
suggests that expert activity involves a disciplining of  the manner in which one experiences time. There is, we 
might say, a kind of  expert-induced amnesia, which is actually not necessarily a weakness. As such, we have an 
account of  the synthesis of  the living-present, as well as a normative account of  how to ‘successfully’ live time, 
at least in relation to some specific skill domains. These domains may differ importantly from the domain of  
philosophy, art, and other creative endeavours, but I will leave this an open question, other than to say that I 
think there is a continuum here rather than a difference in kind.
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Of  course, one needs to be able to adjust when the cricket bat is unready-to-hand, as Heidegger might say. 
When Adam Gilchrist or Ricky Ponting, say, keep getting dismissed by spin bowlers on the subcontinent, it is 
probably true that some kind of  integration of  reflection and practice is required, some kind of  integration 
between acting and thinking, doing and knowing. Even if  you wouldn’t want to be thinking too much during 
a test-match, prior thought and preparation will inform your procedural memory. As such, we can and 
should complicate the Dreyfusian account a little. But the point is that phenomenology seems perfectly able 
to describe such experiences, as well as to explain the skill acquisition that is fundamental to such expertise. 
Phenomenological descriptions, for example, help us to see the manner in which our experience of  time is 
aligned with the movements of  a body-subject. They also help us to see the need for the adding of  retentive and 
protentive elements to any idea of  a ‘now’ moment, rather than deploying a model of  time that involves a series 
of  instants. In addition, a phenomenology of  bodily intentionality and anticipation helps to render explicable 
the ability of  batsmen to respond in a timely fashion, since bodily know-how functions at a far quicker and more 
immediate way than would be suggested by the old representationalist model in which one passively perceives 
the sense data, then makes an active judgment regarding what to do, and then reacts, all while still attending to 
the trajectory of  the ball10. 
Of  course, this isn’t all, or even a large part, of  what phenomenological philosophers say about time, not 
considering the detailed descriptions of  Heidegger on boredom, care, etc., or Levinas’ work in Time and the Other, 
to give two key examples. Husserl also insists that past, present and future are different from retention, primal 
impression and protention. As Hoy puts it, “we experience ourselves as in time and as having a past, present, 
and future because our temporality involves the structure of  protention, retention and primal impression”11. 
It is perhaps fair to say, however, that the synthesis of  time involved in what phenomenologists called the 
‘living-present’ involves emphasising this integrative aspect, this gathering together, and in the work of  Husserl 
and Merleau-Ponty it is also privileged. In the latter’s work, our bodily intentionality helps us to secure an 
equilibrium with the world and a normalising trajectory that allows us to succeed in various areas of  expertise. 
The question is, however, whether this is but  a phenomenological/psychological illusion as John Searle or 
Daniel Dennett might maintain, or a transcendental illusion as Widder and Deleuze might suggest, or whether 
there is something problematic about both of  these kinds of  dismissals of  the phenomenological rendering of  
the times of  our lives. While analytic philosophers often look to physics and the neurosciences for an answer to 
this question (the empirical conditions of  objective time, or the empirical conditions of  our experience of  time), 
Widder and Deleuze look to what we might call a transcendental psychoanalysis. Transcendental philosophy and 
Freud are thought to get us beyond the time of  consciousness and the time of  embodied subjectivity, such that 
‘I’ become a “multiplicity of  subjects living different temporalities within the same not so unified being”12. Both 
challenge the philosophical significance of  any phenomenological conception of  the living-present and want to 
look beyond such experience to its conditions, and in both cases it involves a preoccupation with metaphysical 
issues in relation to time. For analytic philosophy, the key question is typically whether the experience of  time’s 
passage and/or the ‘now’ are real or a subjective illusion, with the truth about time typically being thought to 
be that which is revealed by the physicist. For Widder/Deleuze, there is no need to make this objectivist move: 
transcendental philosophy can reveal the partiality and, ultimately, illusory nature of  this experience of  the 
‘now’ and the living-present from ‘within’, rather than presupposing a view from nowhere. As Widder puts 
the claim, “an inversion of  the relation of  time and movement is here required. Insofar as time is read off  of  
movement, Deleuze argues, we are given only an indirect image of  what it is”13.
Now it is perhaps true that much of  the above account of  the lived-time of  the cricket player is indirect. It is 
also not entirely unfair to associate this with phenomenology more generally. But the question is what kind of  
direct image of  time might be proffered instead, noting the long acknowledged aporias and difficulties with 
directly philosophizing about time, illustrated by Aristotle, Heidegger, Derrida, to mention a few, and famously 
lamented by Augustine: “What then is time? I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me: but 
if  I am asked what it is and try to explain it, I am baffled”14. Assuming that one is not content to simply trace 
time from the empirical (that is, from post-Einsteinian physics and four-dimensionalism, where time’s difference 
from space is ultimately effaced), is the solution to radically distinguish time from movement, bodies, etc. (as 
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with Bergson) and to insist on time as a formal transcendental condition in a quasi-Kantian manner? (as with 
Deleuze). Maybe. Such answers will certainly differ from the phenomenological accounts of  time of  (the later) 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, where time and space (incl. movement) are intimately connected. Merleau-
Ponty insists that one need not take the Bergsonian pill of  radically separating time and space and privileging 
the former, and post Being and Time Heidegger also emphasizes time-space, and on certain interpretations, 
place. For both, the metaphysical question of  which came first, time or the subject/Dasein, is misplaced. As 
Merleau-Ponty says in Phenomenology of  Perception, “We are not saying that time is for someone… we are saying 
that time is someone… We must understand time as the subject and the subject as time” (PP: 422). Given that 
we know that the subject for Merleau-Ponty in this period is a body-subject, then motility and time are clearly 
bound up with one another on his view. Bodily motility and bodily intentionality seem from the beginning of  
life to be temporally tensed: proprioception is evident at the earliest stages of  in utero life, and in neo-natal life the 
perception of  an object gives us hitherto undisclosed sides, sides that our attention might be directed towards 
and which we necessarily anticipate. If  these kind of  conditions of  bodily subjectivity are also conditions of  
a “world” in Heidegger’s sense, does this mean idealism? It depends on whether Merleau-Ponty means “time 
is the subject” metaphysically. If  he did, this would seem to entail that so-called objective time is derivative of  
the time of  our lives, and it might hence be protested what while our experience of  objective time (objective 
time ‘for us’ as Quentin Meillassoux might say) may be derivative of  this lived time, that doesn’t mean there is 
any metaphysical relationship of  derivation. On this latter view, we might more plausibly read Merleau-Ponty’s 
comment as simply referring to the manner in which our learning about the world is through and through 
temporally tensed, as well as the manner in which our situated experience of  time is also what enables self-
reflection and the constitution of  subjectivity. 
This is a long story that we cannot detail here, but suffice to say that for Deleuze time still needs to be unhinged 
from this too subjective a perspective. The key problem with this account of  time is that it does not seem to offer 
an account of  the ‘new’, and why it is that time (including our experience of  it, is always cut, nicked, or broken 
up, and exposed to an unknown future). Deleuze’s various books hence argue that genuine creativity requires 
a rather different experience of  time, a form of  time that the apparent ‘excesses’ of  sadism and masochism are 
more open to, and which he and Derrida both borrow from Hamlet, the Northern Prince, and call “time out of  
joint” (while some maintain that this condition cannot be experienced, there is much in Difference and Repetition 
that implies otherwise). On the other hand, it seems from my account of  the cricket player that it is precisely 
the integrative aspects of  temporal experience that open up a horizon in all of  its difference and variability. 
This, of  course, is one of  Husserl’s reasons for privileging the living-present: memorial time and narrative time 
in we which project particular futures all depend on this primary temporal immersion that is the living-present 
and are inconceivable without it. While Deleuze, Derrida, and others have given us sufficient reason to worry 
about this trajectory of  grounding all aspects of  temporality in the “living-present”, any stronger claim than 
that, however, such as that the former are an illusion and tacitly a debased conservatism, seem to me to be rather 
more tenuous, and whether their own transcendental philosophy of  time is any better placed than Husserl’s is 
not so clear, being generally illuminative rather than strictly necessitarian. Likewise, while a normative emphasis 
on the nick of  time—the contretemps—that sunders identity has value, we have also seen that there are normative 
virtues associated with the temporal amnesia that I have described. As Nietzsche says, “without forgetfulness, 
there can be no happiness, no hope, no present”15. Let us briefly consider Deleuze, Derrida, and Widder on 
“time out of  joint” before returning to this question.
DELEUZE AND DERRIDA: TIME OUT OF JOINT
While Deleuze’s (and Widder’s) account of  time out of  joint is argued to be a formal condition for experience 
to have the structure that it does, it is important to note that it is not merely a neutral transcendental claim, also 
being explicitly associated with actual traumatic experiences like that of  Hamlet (and learning to swim, etc.) and 
having a clear normative register. When Shakespeare has Hamlet declare that time is out of  joint or unhinged16, 
this is predominantly a recognition that various actual events have monstrously violated Hamlet’s sense of  his 
world, including most notably the murder of  his father, and his mother’s remarriage to his uncle. They paralyse 
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him before he becomes equal to the act. This kind of  aporetic impasse, this undecidability, is essential to the 
notion of  ‘time out of  joint’ for Derrida in Spectres of  Marx. Indeed, Derrida’s point—which hovers between 
being a form of  conceptual analysis and being more metaphysically committed—is that the only time in which 
something can ever happen, is when time is out of  joint, when there is a constitutive not knowing what to do 
and how to be. “Time out of  joint” hence has something to do with what Derrida calls contretemps (SM: 77), 
which indicates an unforeseen occurrence or event, but is more literally translated as the untimely, or counter-
time. Derrida is clear that the untimely is not, however, atemporal, but is rather counter to linear time, and 
teleological history, with its seasons, regularity and order. Contretemps is the condition for vulgar time, the time 
of  the present, but it is also that which breaks that living-present apart. It is the time of  the event.
For Derrida and Deleuze, there is a sense in which this disjointed experience of  time is more pervasive than 
that being a response to actual worldly trauma, but is also a condition for our experience of  the living-present, 
albeit one that is covered over and concealed by experience itself. In this respect, time out of  joint might refer 
to the manner in which waiting is essential to all experience, as well as the manner in which every experience 
contains an aspect of  lateness17. Later in his career, Derrida will call this kind of  relation to time “anachronism”. 
Anachronism is an error of  sorts, a relating to an event or custom or ritual as if  from the wrong time. It 
suggests someone, or something, is out of  harmony with time, the living present. While there are clearly forms 
of  anachronism that may be problematic—interpreting the past from the perspective of  our own current 
predilections and interests—there is also something positive to anachronism for Derrida. In times of  crisis when 
the new (and potentially violent) threatens to erupt in revolutionary crisis, Derrida suggests the more that one 
needs to borrow from past, and to attend to spectres and hauntings (SM: 109). This might not be in the form of  
nostalgia for the past, but some kind of  spectral or uncanny visitation is required. Of  course, precisely what we 
saw the sportsperson does not seem to want, or need, is such visitations. 
In arguably the central part of  Difference and Repetition, the account of  the eternal return of  difference and 
the disjunctive synthesis of  time, Deleuze also invokes the Northern Prince. For Deleuze, prior to his father’s 
murder, Hamlet’s experience of  time was oriented around “those properly cardinal points through which pass 
the periodic movements which it measures”—time was measured in relation to orderly movements of  the world, 
sun and moon, dinner, duties, etc. Deleuze says “a time out of  joint means demented time or time outside the 
curve… freed from the event which made up its content, its relation to movement overturned” (DR: 88). The 
movements by which time had been measured are disrupted, leaving only an empty form of  time that eschews 
the unity of  the subject. Widder pays a lot of  attention to this fractured self, explaining its psychoanalytic 
provenance and seeking to problematise the normalising trajectory of  bodies seeking an equilibrium (the return 
of  the same rather than difference, we must assume). While neither he nor Deleuze want to dispute that this 
happens (at a superficial level), they want to revalue another kind of  temporal condition for the living-present, 
which is also both an ‘experience’ of  sorts, hence the analogy with Hamlet, as well as a kind of  regulative idea 
for how to live. This unhinging, to return to Shakespeare, fractures the self  and opens it to a becoming-other of  
some kind. On Widder’s view, time is a structure or disjunctive synthesis that ungrounds movement, including 
the idea of  the flow, or passage, of  time (p3). As Widder puts it: “‘time’ names the structure, not the measure, of  
change. It is a kind of  being out of  synch with oneself  that is the condition of  anything to change or move” (p6). 
This reversal also carries risks of  idealism, as Widder acknowledges (p6). He also accepts that “an ontology of  
time is a human (although not a humanist) ontology” (Widder p4). It seems, then, if  we conjoin these sentences, 
that the condition for anything to change or move is that the human being is out of  sync with itself. Prima facie 
this looks like idealism. Of  course, this risk of  idealism would be ameliorated if  we took the phenomenological 
step (with its alleged metaphysical agnosticism) of  saying that Deleuze is just talking about temporality insofar as 
it manifests itself  in human existence, but Deleuze’s metaphysics and transcendental philosophy (and Bergson’s) 
trades on stronger claims than this, extending to all things (wheat, for example). There is hence an equivocation 
about the level of  analysis, or at least there is a difference between Widder’s account of  time and Deleuze’s. 
Not only is time out of  joint a transcendental condition for all experience, but Deleuze also indicates that we can 
also better affirm and embrace this time, if  only we could become good throwers of  the dice, embracing both 
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chance and necessity. This is why in Difference and Repetition he repeatedly refers to an essential “apprenticeship 
of  learning” (DR: 164). This latter phrase is intended to evoke experiences where one is radically disrupted, 
forced to instigate new ways of  existing. Consider Deleuze’s preferred example of  learning, which is about 
learning to swim. He suggests that learning to swim, or learning a foreign language, means “composing the 
singular points of  one’s own body or one’s own language with those of  another shape or element, which tears us 
apart but also propels us into a hitherto unknown and unheard-of  world of  problems” (DR: 192). The kind of  
learning experience with which Deleuze is primarily concerned is not only that of  the beginner and novice, but 
also the end, paradoxically enough, and that which constitutes true expertise and stands as an exemplar for a 
life of  encounters and exposure to difference. The genuinely important aspect of  learning is the way in which it 
always involves a violent training, a traumatic experiment in apprenticeship. At one stage Deleuze compares the 
experience of  learning to the acephalic, the albino, the aphasic (DR: 165), and this understanding of  learning 
rejects the more normative claim that a suitably refined adjustment towards one’s environment is the telos of  
learning and skill acquisition, and the account of  time and the living-present which is bound up with it. Instead, 
Deleuze valorises those learning experiences that force us out of  any such equilibrium with our environment; 
the kind of  structural coupling between subject and world that is pivotal to the constitution of  a living-present. 
Within certain bounds, we must aspire to be the perpetual apprentice, to encounter new situations that are 
inassimilable to our average coping techniques, and to become a nomad who is never at home18. Such analyses 
do have a certain phenomenological resonance, even if  they are also argued to be more than that. We might, 
for example, invoke a related image of  the sportsplayer who “counter-actualises” situations, and for whom it 
is a matter of  not simply responding to the actual (even in the attenuated sense of  actuality with its projective 
and retentive aspects as described above), but is fundamentally about negotiating the intensities provoked by 
past experiences and hopes for an unknown future (the famous Deleuzian war-time example is Joë Bousquet in 
The Logic of  Sense). 
Indeed, in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari claim that nomads change their habits so as not to change 
their habitat (ice and desert), but migrants move and change their habitat so as not to change their habits. In 
relation to this opposition, Deleuze and Guattari side with the nomads (as a regulative ideal at least—they call 
them the noumena of  history), but perhaps a philosopher like Merleau-Ponty and cognitive scientists indebted 
to him, are tacitly on the side of  the migrants. Although circumstance changes, and we must consistently adjust, 
there is a normative impetus to attaining maximum grip on an environment (this is an evolutionary pressure 
too), to what cognitive scientists call structural coupling between organism and environment. Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that any genuine creativity or learning must be provoked by something traumatic, or at least 
the possibility of  trauma must be omnipresent to sustain creative performance in any domain, but perhaps 
particularly philosophy and art. It is easy to get an intuitive grasp of  what they are on about in this regard. We 
have all seen great performers in the early stages of  their careers, who, some short time later, flush with success, 
are totally confident in coping with the pressures of  live performance, but have lost something vital about their 
performance. And Deleuze, Widder, and others, are clearly right to suggest that life is not exhausted by bodily 
coping (and the time of  the living-present, l’habitude), that even the activity of  the cricket player is not done 
justice to without some reference to what we might summarise as ‘time out of  joint’, in both its formal and also 
more experiential guises. Perhaps there are also some strategic reasons for privileging ‘lost time’ in modernity, 
given the sense in which clock time is increasingly dominant. But worlds and lives change, whether the self  is 
fractured, whether Joe is thrown into the volcano or not. If  there is a law, it is that of  change, but it is never 
clear to me that the transcendental arguments about time out of  joint (or structural equivalents) that are bound 
up with a recognition of  this fact are compelling. They typically depend upon an opposition between the event 
and inexorable sameness, predictable predicates, etc. But is every philosophy of  mediation, of  continuums, 
necessarily condemned to be unable to explain the event/change? It is not clear that this is so. Transcendental 
reasoning of  this sort depends upon a contrast that excludes other possibilities and cannot establish that its 
alleged conditions are the uniquely valid ones. Although I can only gesture towards this here, it seems to 
me that what we are witness to in these temporal disputes between phenomenologists and poststructuralists 
is an account of  the time(s) of  our lives which is irremediably split in both of  these directions, and which 
problematises any attempt to adequately ground the one in the other. In regard to the association between time 
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and politics, it seems to me that this quasi-transcendental necessity also precludes any too easy decision in the 
realm of  the ethico-political (e.g. change and rupture vs. sameness and coping).
Jack Reynolds is a Senior Lecturer at LaTrobe University, the author of  Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, 
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